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AVIATION INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES
"BEWARE THE RENTER PILOT"
Guy H. RIDDLE
I. INTRODUCTION
IDE FROM THE many obvious pitfalls that owners of light
ircraft face--i.e. the expenses associated with operation
and maintenance, violations of unknown FAA regulations, and
operational and mechanical failures while in flight--they also
face less obvious, or quite frequently ignored, pitfalls pertaining
to the insurance coverage provided by the aviation policies cov-
ering their aircraft. One frequently ignored, or unsuspected,
pitfall deals with whether the aircraft owner's aviation policy will
cover claims for hull loss and/or liability arising out of the crash
of the owner's aircraft while being rented, chartered and/or
used without authorization. This paper will address some of the
issues and case law associated with light aircraft owners renting
and/or chartering their aircraft in violation of their insurance
policies, as well as coverage for unauthorized use.
II. INSURANCE COVERAGE DEFENSES
Many aircraft owners who have "Pleasure and Business Use"
policies, also known as "Non-Commercial Use" policies, rent
their aircraft to friends, acquaintances, and strangers to deflect
some of the indirect costs of owning and maintaining their air-
craft. However, unless the insurance policy covers such rentals,
the owners and their renter-pilots may find themselves without
coverage for the loss of the aircraft and/or liability (defense and
indemnity) coverage when the aircraft is involved in an acci-
dent. In light of the catastrophic nature of aviation accidents,
this could have serious financial consequences for the insured
owner, the renter-pilot, and/or their respective estates.
In connection with excluded use for rental and/or charter of
aircraft under Pleasure and Business policies, insurance carriers
have several defenses to providing coverage, including: (i)
407
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fraud/misrepresentation in the insurance application; (ii)
"commercial use" exclusion; (iii) renter-pilot exclusion; and (iv)
conversion exclusion.'
A. FRAUD / MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION IN APPLICATION
Like most insurance policies, aviation policies require in-
sureds to provide truthful information in their insurance appli-
cations.2 Most policies explicitly void the coverage in the case of
fraud, attempted fraud, false swearing, or misrepresentation of
any material fact or circumstance in connection with the insur-
ance policy.3 Each insurance carrier has its own application
form that should clearly describe that the policy is for pleasure
and business use (non-commercial) 4 or request information re-
garding the prospective insured's intent to charter or rent the
aircraft.
Although most insureds complete policy applications truth-
fully, many, either knowingly or unwittingly, do not provide ac-
curate information regarding the intended use of the aircraft.
In the case of the unwitting prospective insured, a mistaken ma-
terial misrepresentation, at least under Texas law, will not void the
policy.5 However, in the case of an insured who knowingly pro-
vides inaccurate information to avoid paying higher insurance
premiums associated with renting or chartering his or her air-
craft, the policy is likely void ab initio.
The claim investigation may reveal that the insured intended
all along to use the aircraft outside the parameters of a Pleasure
and Business Use policy. Typical evidence of such intent may
I See, e.g., 45 CJ.S. Insurance § 777 (2005).
2 45 CJ.S. Insurance § 770 (2005).
3 Id.
4 Non Commercial Business Use typically does not provide coverage for Flights
that result in a "charge."
5 It is well established Texas law that an insurer may invalidate a policy of in-
surance on the basis of the insured's misrepresentations in the insurance applica-
tion only if the insurer can successfully plead and prove the following five
elements: (1) the making of the representation; (2) the falsity of the representa-
tion; (3) reliance thereon by the insurer; (4) the intent to deceive on the part of
the insured in making same; and (5) the materiality of the representation. Al-
bany Ins. Co. v. Anh Thi Kiev, 927 F.2d 822, 891 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Mayes v.
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 608 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. 1980); S. Life & Health Ins.
Co. v. Medrano, 698 S.W.2d 457, 461 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, writ ref d
n.r.e)). The insurer must prove that the insured made some material misrepre-
sentation, willfully and with design to deceive or defraud the insurer. Id. (citing
Soto v. S. Life & Health Ins. Co., 776 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1989, no writ)).
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include ownership in a Part 135 operation, previous rental or
charter of the subject aircraft, and/or correspondence detailing
intended uses of the aircraft that predates the completion of the
insurance application. If such evidence is adduced during the
claim investigation, an insurance carrier may rely on the avoid-
ance language in the policy to deny coverage of any claim, in-
cluding hull loss and liability, arising out of an aviation accident.
Although an insured's fraud or misrepresentation may be a via-
ble defense to coverage when the aircaft is rented or charted in
violation of the policy, the theory is often not effective because
the insurer is required to show the insured's subjective intent to
deceive.
B. "COMMERCIAL USE" EXCLUSION
The more common method for excluding coverage to an in-
sured who rents or charters an aircraft in violation of a Pleasure
and Business policy is to rely on the stated use of the aircraft as
set forth in the policy's declarations, along with the policy's defi-
nition of "non-commercial" or "pleasure and business."' The
typical Pleasure and Business policy will provide coverage for
use in the insured's business, including personal and pleasure
uses, but it will exclude coverage for hire or reward.7 Today,
most Pleasure and Business policies extend coverage where pay-
ments are made to cover the direct cost of a flight, including,
fuel, oil, and insurance and hangar expenses involved with the
particular flight.8 However, if a payment includes indirect oper-
ating expenses, it is likely that the flight will not be covered.9
Texas, as well as other jurisdictions, has long embraced the
exclusion of rental use in aircraft policies.' 0 Any charge exceed-





Id. at 1169 (Finding that a $10.00 an hour assesment for use of aircraft over
and above cost of fuel constituted a charge, and as such, accident was not within
coverage of the policy) (emphasis added); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Siegel, 625 F.
Supp. 693 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (holding payment including amount beyond operat-
ing costs were charges constituting "rental use" which fell outside of the "Pleasure
and Business" limitation of the policy); Kohler v. Proprietors Ins. Co., 394 So. 2d
463 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that insured could not recover for aircraft
hull and liability policy that excluded from coverage any operation of aircraft for
which a charge was made even though the required charge was being paid to
third party charitable organization); Flagstaff Mortuary, Inc. v. Gamble, 662 P.2d
149, 151 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Avemco Ins. Co. v. Auburn Flying Serv. Inc., 242
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ing the direct operating cost of the aircraft constitutes a flight
for which a charge was made."I In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. ACEL
Delivery Service, Inc., the insureds sought a declaratory judgment
that coverage existed for liability claims filed by the estates of
two passengers who died when the insured's aircraft crashed.' 2
The policy's stated use was for "pleasure and business," which it
defined as "[p]ersonal, pleasure, family and business uses ex-
cluding an operation for which a charge is made."' 3 The issue
before the Fifth Circuit was whether a $10.00-per hour charge,
in addition to the cost of fuel and storage, constituted a
"charge" within the policy exclusion. 4 The appellees (the in-
sureds) argued that the term "charge" meant "profit" and that
the reimbursement of expenses was not a "charge" as defined by
the meaning of the policy. 15 The insureds introduced evidence
that the $10.00-per hour assessment would barely cover the air-
craft's expenses, and that the average rental of a similar aircraft
was $25.00- to $35.00- per hour. 6 Despite the evidence that the
charge would not make the value "profitable," the court held
that the appropriate standard for determining whether a charge
was made depended on the motivation for making the flight. 7
The pilot also gave an $84.00 check to the owner and operator
of the flying service for the use of the aircraft."8 The court
found the payment of $84.00 was not a voluntary gesture, but
was a motivating factor and prerequisite to the flight taking
place, and thus, the charge fell within the meaning of the pol-
icy. 9 The Fifth Circuit also upheld the district court's findings
based on its determination that the $10.00-per hour charge was
beyond those allowed under the narrowly defined charges in the
policy.20
In Monarch Insurance Co. of Ohio v. Siegel, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted a mo-
F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 2001) (charging a $10.00 fee for a ride in an airplane
during a "fly-in" was a quid pro quo exchange for which a charge was made, and
as such, was not covered by the policy).
11 Pac. Indem. Co., 485 F.2d at 1169.
12 Id. at 1170.
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tion for summary judgment in favor of Monarch.2 The court
held that the aviaiton insurance policy did not provide liability
or hull loss coverage where the pilot agreed to pay the owner of
the aircraft $46.00-per hour to use the aircraft, in addition to
direct operating costs of gas and oil.2 2 In Monarch, the policy
was issued for "pleasure and business. '23 The policy defined
pleasure and business as "personal and pleasure use in direct
connection with the insured's business, excluding any operation
for which a charge is made. '24 The owner of the aircraft admit-
ted in his deposition that the $46.00-per hour charge was de-
signed to cover the maintenance reserve for the plane and the
cost of annual inspections. 25 The court found that the expenses
were not "direct" operating expenses. 26
In Kohler v. Proprietors Insurance Co., the Third District Florida
Court of Appeals upheld a summary judgment in favor of Pro-
prietor's Insurance Co. ("Proprietor's"), finding that it did not
owe its insured for a hull loss claim when the aircraft was seized
by Colombian authorities. 27 The court held that the $125.00-
per hour payment for use of the plane was a charge because the
payment was a prerequisite to the use of the plane, not a gratui-
tous reimbursement of flight expenses. 2  The court further
noted that, even though the charge was to be paid to a third-
party charitable organization, the status of the payee did not
have any effect on the decision-calculus of whether the payment
constituted a charge under the policy. 29
In Avernco Insurance Co. v. Auburn Flying Service, Inc., an insurer
of a non-commercial aviation liability policy sought a declaratory
judgment against the personal representative of the deceased
pilot after an accident.30 Avemco alleged that the commercial
purpose exclusion applied to the crash, because it occurred
while the pilot was giving rides in exchange for a fee.3" The
passengers paid $10.00 for a ten- to fifteen-minute airplane
' 625 F. Supp. 693.
22 Id. at 699-700.
2'1 Id. at 696.
24 Id. at 699.
'2, Id.
26 Id.
27 394 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
28 Id.
29 Id.
' 242 F.3d 819.
I 1d. at 821.
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ride.12 On the ninth trip of the day, while attempting to land,
the plane struck a passing truck and crashed. 3 Everyone on the
plane died in the crash.3 4 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's summary judgment on the ground that there was no
coverage for the fatal flight.3 5
The insurance policy contained the following exclusion of
coverage: "This policy does not cover bodily injury, property
damage, or loss... [w] hen your insured aircraft is... used for a
commercial purpose." The policy also contained the following
definition: "'Commercial prupose' means any use of your in-
sured aircraft for which an insured person receives, or intends
to receive, money or other benefits. It does not include: the
equal sharing among occupants of the operating cost of the
flight. 36
The Eighth Circuit, after distinguishing other "for a charge"
cases, held that the policy language was not ambiguous. 7 In
reaching its conclusion, the court considered the general pur-
pose for the exclusionary clause a.3 The court found that the ex-
clusionary language of the policy limited risk by removing the
motivation to make flights because the policy holder received
payment. 9 The court analyzed four factors in determining
whether the fee was a shared expense or a simple receipt of
money: (i) the relationship of the amount paid to the expenses
of a flight; (ii) the existence of a community of interest in taking
the flight, other than the flight itself; (iii) the voluntariness of
the payment; and (4) any indication of a quid pro quo.4 0
Even though the $10.00 payment was not enough to cover all
expenses of the flight, the court found that the exchange consti-
tuted a payment rather than equally shared expenses." In arriv-
ing at this conclusion, the court looked at the depositions of the
other passengers.4 2 The deposition testimony showed the lack




35 Id. at 826.
36 Id. at 821.
37 Id. at 822.
38 Id. at 823.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 824.
41 Id. at 825.
42 Id. at 825-26.
43 Id. at 825.
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also showed that at no time did the agreement state that the
$10.00 amount was only for expenses.44 The court held that the
pilot and his passengers "possessed no community of interest
other than just taking the flight itself."'4" The court also found
that by advertising flights for $10.00 and providing the flights in
conjunction with the event, the pilot was providing a flight ser-
vice to the general public.46 The court then distinguished the
conduct in the case from taking family or friends on joy rides.47
In concluding, the court stated "[b]y offering flights to anyone
willing to pay the fee, [the pilot] increased the number of flights
he would make with the plane, and increased the risk to the
insurer beyond that contemplated in the insurance contract.
Consequently, the flight in question was for the receipt of
money and was not an equal sharing of expenses."48
In General Insurance Co. (SAFECO) v. Flanco Leasing, Inc., the
Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded a summary
judgment in favor of the insureds, Flanco and CCT, against the
insuror, General Insurance ("SAFECO"), for the agreed value of
the hull of an aircraft plus a twelve-percent penalty and attor-
neys' fees.49 In the case, SAFECO denied the insured's claim for
the value of the hull.5" SAFECO argued that, at the time of the
crash, the aircraft was not being used for its stated purpose of
"industrial aid. '51 The policy defined "industrial aid" as "per-
sonal, pleasure, family and business uses and transportation of
executives, employees, guests and customers, excluding any op-
eration for which a charge is made other than the sharing or
reimbursement of direct operating expenses incurred for the
flight. '52 In reversing the summary judgment, the court noted
that a $75.00-per hour fee was generally assessed against passen-
gers who used the aircraft.5 ' The court also noted that the pilot
acknowledged receiving payment from the deceased passenger
on previous flights and that he had been censured by the FAA
for doing so.5 Additionally, the owner of the plane acknowl-
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 826.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 No. CA 95-775, 1996 WL 494650 (Ark. App. Aug. 28, 1996).
5o Id. at *2.
51 Id.
52 Id.
51 Id. at *34.
54 Id. at *24.
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edged under oath that he engaged in conversations about the
use of the aircraft for charter purposes and provided invoices
that showed that the aircraft had been used for profit on previ-
ous occasions.55 The court found this evidence enough to raise
a question of fact sufficient to overcome the motion for sum-
mary judgment. 6
In Flagstaff Mortuaiy, Inc. v. Gamble, the appellee sued his in-
surance agent for failing to provide a new insurance policy iden-
tical to a second policy.57 The trial court granted the insurance
agency's motion for summaryjudgment. 58 The court found that
an agent is not liable for failing to procure a second identical
policy where coverage would be excluded under the original
policy.59 The suit arose from a crash of a Flagstaff Mortuary air-
craft. 6° Before the accident, the pilot promised to pay $100.00
to use the aircraft.61 On the second leg of a round-trip flight
between Flagstaff and Phoenix, the aircraft crashed and sus-
tained severe hull damage. 62 The Arizona Court of Appeals up-
held summary judgment in the insurer's favor, because the
payment was a charge within the meaning of the policy exclu-
sion.63 The appellate court held, as a matter of law, that the
policy exclusion applied because the payment was for more than
the direct operating cost of the flight.64 In fact, the evidence
showed that the $100.00 payment for the flight far exceeded the
anticipated costs and nearly matched the hourly rate for the
commercial rental of the aircraft.6 5 The court concluded that
the $100.00 payment was intended to reimburse the plaintiff for
indirect costs of operation, including maintenance.6 6
In Ferro Corp. v. Aviation Insurance Managers, Inc., the Tennes-
see Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that Ferro,
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 662 P.2d 149 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983).
58 Id. at 150.
59 Id. at 152.
60 Id. at 150.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 151.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 152. The evidence further showed that a round-trip flight between
Flagstaff and Phoenix takes approximately one hour and twenty-four minutes
and that the cost of fuel for this flight was approximately $20. Id. The evidence





a previous lessee and a named insured under an aviation liability
policy, was not entitled to avoid liability arising out of the crash
of an aircraft and death of its occupants."7 At the time of the
crash, Abernathy Auto Parts ("Abernathy") owned the plane but
Ferro controlled the plane under an oral rental agreement."
Ferro was permitted to rent the aircraft at any time for a $35.00-
per hour charge."9 Originally, Ferro and Abernathy had a writ-
ten lease agreement that listed Ferro as an additional named
insured under Abernathy's aviation insurance policy.7" How-
ever, prior to the flight, Ferro requested to be removed from the
insurance policy and sought reimbursement for the unused pre-
mium.7 ' Even though Ferro never received a premium reim-
bursement, the trial court held that, at the time of the crash,
Ferro was no longer an insured under the policy.72 The court
further found that because Ferro paid $35.00-per hour for the
use of the aircraft, the plane was not used for "industrial aid" by
an insured. 7' Thus, the defendant owed no duty to defend or
provide coverage to Ferro under the policy.74
In Smith v. Ranger Insurance Co., the Third Circuit Louisiana
Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment against Ranger on an ac-
tion for liability and hull loss coverage arising out of the crash of
an insured's airplane.7  Ranger denied coverage on the ground
that the flight was a "charter" flight and not covered under the
limited commercial use policy. 7"' The policy defined "Limited
Commercial use" as including pleasure and business, industrial
aid, student instruction and rental to pilots, but excluding pas-
senger, carrying for hire or reward. 77 The Court of Appeals af-
firmed, due to conflicting evidence as to whether the price
terms were certain and determinant, as required by the Louisi-
ana Civil Codes.78
In United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Cowley & Associates, an in-
surer brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking to avoid
67 462 S.W.2d 523 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1970).
I8 ld. at 525.
IdJ.
711 d. at 524.
1 (1. at 525.
72 Id. at 529.
7 3 Id. at 532.
74 1d.
75 301 So. 2d 673 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
76 Id. at 674-75.
77 i. at 674.
7, Id. at 676.
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liability claims filed under the policy.7" The policy provided for
personal and pleasure use, as well as use in direct connection
with the insured's business, but excluded coverage for any flight
operation for which a charge was made."° The owner allowed
the independent contractor pilot to fly the plane for business
endeavors.8 ' Because the flight was for the pilot's business, the
insurer alleged the flight was part of a "charter. '8 2 The Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed the finding against the insurer and
stated:
[s] ince all of the passengers died in the crash, none was available
to testify whether or not arrangements had been made for pay-
ment for the flight. There were no invoices, memos, bills, pre-
flight charges, or other documents or testimony evidencing a
charge made by McConnell for the flight or the intention of the
passengers to pay any amount to McConnell for the flight. In his
deposition Cowley testified that he did not make and has not
made a charge relative to the operation of his plane on the fatal
flight; that using the plane as a charter for profit was strictly pro-
hibited; and that it was never used in that way as far as he knew.
Cowley further testified that McConnell had his own construc-
tion management company and was an architect with a substan-
tial engineering background, and that he allowed McConnell to
use the plane for McConnell's architectural, engineering, drafts-
man, and construction management work. Cowley said he did
not receive cash reimbursements for allowing McConnell to use
the plane; instead, McConnell repaid him by piloting him free of
charge.83
The Court further held that the insurer's only evidence was an
implication that McConnell would charge for the flight because
he had done so in the past. 4 The court concluded that U.S.
Fire did not meet its burden to affirmatively show that a charge
was made for the flight, and as such, summary judgment was
appropriate.85
In Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Ivens, the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of an
insured against Houston Fire in its declaratory judgment ac-




83 Id. at 162.




tion.8" Houston Fire sought determination that it was not liable
under its policy for the deaths of the passengers on the air-
craft.17 The policy in question was classified as a Pleasure and
Business Use policy."8 The Court evaluated a charge as "the
price demanded for a thing or service," and held that the $60.00
contribution was not a charge but a gratuitous offer to defray
gas costs.8" The Court stated:
It is clear on the record that Ivens and Fletcher had planned the
flight independently and before Ulsch knew anything about it,
and that Ulsch had nothing to say about when or how the flight
would to be made. The agreement of Ulsch to contribute $60.00
toward payment of the cost of gasoline was a voluntary gesture on
his part, based upon his feeling that this was the fair thing for the
Company to do... There was no obligation on the part of Ulsch
or on the part of the Company to provide Fletcher with transpor-
tation to Knoxville to pick up the equipment.9"
C. RENTER PILOT EXCLUDED AS "INSURED"
Another concern that arises with aircraft rental is the cover-
age provided to the renter-pilot. "Limited Commercial" policies
permit rental pilot use of the aircraft; however, this does not
always mean that the renter pilot will be an "insured" for pur-
poses of liability coverage. 91 Several policies that provide cover-
age for the owner of the aircraft for rental use do not provide
coverage for the renter-pilot.1' 2 Renter-pilots should beware of
this defense to coverage before assuming that they will be cov-
ered in the event of an accident.
In Ranger Insurance Co. v. Silverthorne, the Missouri Court of
Appeals held that Ranger was not obligated to defend a pilot in
a suit for injuries sustained by passengers in an accident, where
the insured's limited commercial use policy permitted rental of
the aircraft, but expressly stated that any person operating the
aircraft under a rental agreement was not an insured under the
policy.9 In Ranger, the injured passengers brought suit against
86 338 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1964).
17 Id. at 453.
18 Id. at 453-54. Pleasure and business use was defined by the policy as "per-
sonal, pleasure, family and business use, excluding any operation for which a
charge was made." Id.
89 Id. at 455.
9) Id.
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the pilot and the owner of the aircraft. 4 The pilot and owner
then tendered their defense to Ranger Insurance under the pol-
icy.95 Ranger first denied the policy covered the pilot and
sought a declaratory judgment that the policy did not cover the
pilot.96 The pilot argued that ambiguities plagued the policy,
such as the intended use provision (which covered rental pilots)
and the definition of insured (excluding rental pilots). 97 The
Court held that no ambiguity existed between the definition of
insured and the purposes of use provisions and that:
[t] he 'Purpose (s) of Use, which includes rental to pilots provides
coverage to the named insured for liability which might be im-
posed upon it arising out of such use of the aircraft. The parties
to the contract of insurance were under no obligation to provide
coverage for the rental pilots and by the terms of the policy
elected not to do so. There can be no question as to their right
so to contract.
98
In contrast, the court in Martin v. Ohio Casualty Insurance con-
cluded that a rental pilot was insured under a policy that ex-
cluded rental pilots in the printed definition of "Insured" but
allowed rental of the aircraft to pilots as a purpose of use in the
declaration of "Commercial."99 In so concluding, the Court
stated:
[t]he policy is to be considered as a whole and should be con-
strued liberally in favor of the insured. This is in line with the
Michigan rule as to construction of insurance policies generally.
Where the policy contains both typewritten and printed provi-
sions, the latter must yield to the former because of the rule that
typed provisions are deemed special conditions modifying the
printed portions. It was this latter rule that the trial court in-
voked, and properly so, in ruling that item 6 of the 'declarations'
modified that definition of 'insured' and extended coverage to a
renter pilot. An 'X' was typed into the box in the front of subsec-
tion (e) of item 6, and this is the provision that authorized the
use of the insured aircraft for rental to pilots. We hold that the
94 Id. at 531.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 534.
98 Id.; see also Melton v. Ranger Ins. Co., 515 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that Purposes of Use provision in the pol-
icy, which allowed for rental to pilots, did not modify the definition of "insured"
which expressly excluded renter pilot); but see Martin v. Ohio Cas. Ins., 157
N.W.2d 827 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968).
99 157 N.W.2d at 829.
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court correctly ruled that this provision modified the definition
of 'insured' and extended coverage to plaintiffs. 'To hold other-
wise would be to permit the ... insurance company to "blow hot
and cold" in one breath, or, to give coverage in one part of the
policy and take it away in another." '
D. CONVERSION EXCLUSION
In the event a renter-pilot or lessee decides to use an in-
sured's aircraft for unlawful purposes, a conversion exclusion
may exclude coverage for loss of the aircraft or for liability
claims. Under aviation insurance policies, the conversion exclu-
sion has most often been applied to hull loss claims arising out
of insured aircraft being confiscated by governments for drug
smuggling.'
In General Electric Credit Corp. of Tennessee v. Kelly & Dearing
Aviation, the court held that a lienholder was not entitled to cov-
erage under the lienholder's endorsement for a loss sustained as
a result of the insured airplane being confiscated. 0 2 The
lienholder sought to be paid under the breach of warranty en-
dorsement after the Colombian government confiscated the
plane.""1 Kelly & Dearing ("K&D"), the insured, purchased the
aircraft and executed a promissory note in favor of the
leinholder, GE Credit Corporation ("GECC")." ° 4 Thereafter,
K&D leased the aircraft to Ownby, who obtained an aviation in-
surance policy from Aetna. 10 5 The Aetna policy included a
lienholder endorsement in favor of GECC.'0 6 The aircraft was
later confiscated by the Colombian government for Ownby's ille-
gal transportation of drugs into Columbia. 1' 7 After being noti-
fied of the confiscation, GECC contacted Aetna and sought
10(' Id.; see also Wzontek v. Zurich Ins. Co., 208 A.2d 861 (Pa. 1965) (citations
omitted).
1), Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Care Flight Air Ambulance Serv., Inc., 18 F.3d
323 (5th Cir. 1994); Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Kelly & Dearing Aviation 765
S.W.2d 750 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Carib Aviation,
Inc., 759 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1985); Gelder v. Puritan Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 1117
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983); Swish Mfg. Se. v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 675
F.2d 1218 (11th Cir. 1982).
102 765 S.W.2d at 750.
103 Id. at 751.
104 Id.
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coverage under the lienholder's endorsement.'08 Aetna denied
coverage, citing that Ownby had converted the airplane when
he used it for illegal purposes, an exclusion to the lienholder
endorsement.10 9 The court agreed and held that Aetna was not
liable for payment to GECC under the lienholder endorsement
because the plane had been converted."10 The court reasoned:
In the case at bar, Ownby had legal possession of the airplane
pursuant to his lease from K&D. The lease contained no territo-
rial or other limitations on his use of the aircraft, however, K&D
had the right to assume that Ownby would use it for legal pur-
poses. Ownby's actions in his use of this leased airplane was in
reckless disregard for K&D's right, as owner of the airplane, to
repossession of the property. His action clearly exceeded K&D's
implied consent for his operation of the plane and has com-
pletely deprived them of their property for an indefinite period
of time. The intentional act of Ownby constituted conversion."'
In Gelder v. Puritan Insurance Co., the aviation insurer, Puritan,
moved for summary judgment, claiming that it did not have an
obligation to pay its insured under the hull loss coverage of its
policy for a crash that occurred immediately after the insured's
lessee unloaded a delivery of 28 pounds of marijuana."12 Puri-
tan argued that the loss was excluded under the conversion ex-
clusion. I3 The appellate court upheld the trial court's summary
judgment grant in favor of Puritan. The court found the loss
was excluded because, at the time of the accident, the lessee had
converted the insured's aircraft." 4 The court noted that the
"lease agreement made it clear that the plane was not to be used
'for any violation of federal or state controlled substance laws"'
and, thus, found the lessee had exceeded the authorized use of
the aircraft.' 15
In Swish Manufacturing Southeast v. Mahattan Fire & Marine In-
surance Co., the Eleventh Circuit reversed a summary judgment
action in favor of the insured under an aviation policy." 6 In
that case, Swish Manufacturing ("Swish") leased a plane to a
108 Id. at 752.
109 Id. at 754.
110 Id.
11 Id.
112 668 P.2d 1117, 1118 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1119.
115 Id. at 1118.
116 675 F.2d 1218, 1221 (11th Cir. 1982).
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lessee who agreed not to use the plane for unlawful purposes.' 
17
Swish carried insurance on the plane, but the policy contained
an exclusion for conversion." 8 The lessee then flew the plane
to the Bahamas."" Once it was in the Bahamas, the police con-
fiscated the plane and its cargo of marijuana. 21 While in police
custody, the plane was damaged and electronic equipment was
removed.' 2 ' Swish then demanded payment from the insurance
company; the insurance company refused, relying on the con-
version exclusion of the policy.' 2 2 As a result, Swish sued in dis-
trict court and was granted a partial summary judgment on the
issue of liability. 2  However, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit
held that there was a conversion by Swish's lessee that precluded
payment under the policy. 24 Consequently, the court reversed
and rendered partial summary judgment for the insurance
company. 125
In National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh v. Care Night
Air Ambulance Service, Inc., ("General Electri Capital Corpora-
tion") ECC leased an aircraft to Care Flight. 2 ' The lease pro-
hibited subleasing of the aircraft without GECC's consent, and
further required Care Flight to obtain insurance coverage for
the aircraft.2 7 National Union Fire Insurance Co. ("National
Union") provided Care Flight insurance coverage. 128 The policy
contained a breach of warranty endorsement that named GECC
and Care Flight as beneficiaries. 9 Care Flight, without GECC's
consent, subleased the aircraft to a third party who then sub-
leased it to a subsequent lessee, Contraras.13 ° The Colombian
government seized the aircraft while under Contraras' control
for violations of air traffic laws.''
GECC's insurance carrier, under its subrogation rights,
sought payment from National Union under its policy with Care





122 Id. at 1218.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1221.
125 Id.
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Flight.1 2 National Union filed a request for declaratory judg-
ment and moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
coverage was precluded because Care Flight had converted the
plane. 133 The district court "granted summary judgment in
favor of National Union ruling that Care Flight had converted
the aircraft as a matter of law and that the conversion limitation
in the breach of warranty endorsement precluded coverage."134
The Fifth Circuit held that Care Flight converted the aircraft
when it breached its lease agreement with GECC by entering
into an unauthorized sublease.135 In reaching its conclusion,
the Fifth Circuit analyzed the Second Restatement of Torts as
follows:
'One who is authorized to make a particular use of chattel, and
uses it in a manner exceeding the authorization, is subject to lia-
bility for conversion to another whose right to control the use of
the chattel is thereby seriously violated.' Restatement (Second) of
Torts §28 (1965)). Texas generally follows the elements of con-
version as stated in the Restatement, which provides that '[t]he
limits of permitted use ordinarily are determined by the terms,
expressed or reasonably implied, of the contract or other agree-
ment between the parties, and the question becomes one of
whether there is a material breach of the agreement.' Id. at Cmt.
C.
The district court correctly determined that the unauthorized
sublease of the aircraft was a material breach. Texas law recog-
nizes the distinction between serious violations of another's right
of control, which constitute conversion, and minor or technical
violations insufficient in degree of interference to constitute
conversion. 36
E. CAUSAL CONNECTION REQUIREMENT
Depending on the jurisdiction, insureds may be able to argue
that, in order to use the above-cited exclusions, there must be a
causal connection between the renting and/or conversion of
the aircraft, and the accident for which coverage is sought. For
example, the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Fireman's Fund Insurance








connection must exist. 3 7 In Wilburn Boat, the Fifth Circuit, in-
terpreting a marine insurance policy, held that a breach of a
"private pleasure use" warranty by carrying passengers for hire
was not a defense to coverage unless the breach caused or con-
tributed to the destruction of the insured property.'38 The Fifth
Circuit based its decision on the Texas anti-technicality statute
Article 6.14 of the Texas Insurance Code, which reads:
No breach or violation by the insured of any warranty, condition
or provision of any fire insurance policy, contract of insurance,
or applications therefore, upon personal property, shall render
void the policy or contract, or constitute a defense to a suit for
loss thereon unless such breach or violation contributed to bring
about the destruction of the property.' 9
III. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS AND THE
EIGHT CORNERS RULE
The typical vehicle for determining the rights of the parties to
an insurance contract, including the applicability of the above-
referenced exclusions, is through a declaratory judgment ac-
tion. In the context of hull loss claims, the rules of evidence
and discovery are comparable to a typical breach of contract ac-
tion, and there is no limitation on the evidence that will be con-
sidered by the court outside the applicable evidentiary rules.
However, in the context of a liability claim, Texas courts follow
the "Eight Corners Rules" to determine specifically whether an
insurer has a "duty to defend" its named insured owner or
renter-pilot on claims brought by injured third-parties. 4 '
Under the Eight Corners Rule, the courts look only to the plead-
ings and the insurance policy to determine whether or not the
duty to defend exists. 4' However, in many instances the court is
required to examine facts outside the pleadings. Crafty plain-
tiffs' attorneys do not plead the insured's rental or charter of
the aircraft in an attempt to keep the insurer liable for defense
137 300 F.2d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 1962).
138 Id.
1"'i TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 6.14 (Vernon 2003); but see Electron Mach. Corp. v.
Am. Mercury Ins. Co., 297 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1961) (finding that at the time of
the crash the aircraft was being used to instruct a pilot not named for instruction
purposes, and therefore, the insurance was not in force even though excluded
use was not a cause of the loss).
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costs. This is done in order to negotiate a possible settlement of
noncovered claims. In such instances, Texas courts have cre-
ated an exception to the Eight Corners Rule for extrinsic
evidence.1 4
2
At least one court has suggested that extrinsic evidence may
be used to resolve coverage questions that the complaint itself is
insufficient to resolve.' 4 3 Specifically, "if the underlying com-
plaint, however, does not allege facts, if taken as true, that suffi-
ciently state a cause of action under the policy, evidence
induced in the declaratory judgment action may also be consid-
ered.' 1 44 When extrinsic facts are "insurance facts" that do not
deal with the underlying liability case, they should be admitted
in the declaratory judgment to determine coverage. 141 Cook v.
Ohio Casualty Insuance Co. involved an auto insurance policy that
covered household drivers in some cars, but not others. 46 In
that case, the petition failed to state which member of the
household or which car struck and injured the plaintiff.1 47 Ex-
trinsic evidence was allowed to prove several facts necessary to
resolve the coverage question: (1) which member struck the
plaintiff, and (2) which automobile struck the plaintiff. 4 ' The
evidence was allowed because the identity of the driver and the
specific car are not facts that would affect the merits of the tort
claim. 149
Many courts follow this rule and allow the introduction of ex-
trinsic facts. 5 ° In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wade, the peti-
tion was silent as to whether a boat was used for personal or
business purposes at the time it was involved in an accident.' 5 1
The insurance policy covered pleasure use but not business
142 Matagordo Ventures, Inc. v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 2d 704,
714 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
143 John Deere Ins. Co. v. Truckin' U.S.A., 122 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 1997).
-4 Id. at 272.
145 Cook v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 418 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1967, no writ).
146 Id. at 714-15.
147 Id. at 713-14.
148 Id. at 714.
149 Id. at 716.
150 See, e.g., Int'l Serv. Ins. Co. v. Boll, 392 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1965, writ ref d n.r.e.); Gonzales v. Am. States Ins. Co.,
628 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ); State Farm Fire and
Cas. Co. v. Wade, 827 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
15, 827 S.W.2d at 450.
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use.'5 2 The court held that the insurer could offer evidence that
the boat was being used for the excluded business purposes.153
IV. INSURERS' RIGHT OF SUBROGATION
Another issue that arises frequently after the crash of an air-
craft during a rental flight is whether the insurance company
that pays its named insured for the value of the damaged or
destroyed aircraft has a right to bring a subrogation action
against the renter-pilot who caused the accident. Such a right
would be based upon several factors, including the terms of the
specific policy, and whether the named insured would have a
valid claim against the renter-pilot (i.e., whether an agreement
entered before or after the accident between the named insured
and the renter-pilot limited or extinguished liability for the
renter-pilot).
It is well settled in the area of insurance law that because sub-
rogation may arise only against third persons, an insurer does
not have a right of subrogation against its insured to recover for
sums paid out.' 55 This doctrine is commonly referred to as the
"anti-subrogation rule." 56 An insurer who subrogates itself to its
insured "stands in the shoes" of the insured and cannot recover
by subrogation except to the extent of the rights of the in-
sured. 157 To permit subrogation "would permit an insurer, in
effect, to pass the incident of the loss, either partially or totally,
from itself to its own insured and thus avoid the coverage that its
insured purchased."'' l5  This anti-subrogation rule also applies to
additional insureds. 15' However, the applicability of the anti-sub-
rogation rule to an additional insured who is only an insured
under the liability coverage of a policy (i.e., not covered under
the collision or hull coverage) is not so clear.
In Aviation Employees Insurance Co. v. Barclay, the pilot rented
an aircraft that was subsequently crashed on takeoff. 6 ' The
152 Id.
153 Id. at 453.
154 Aviation Employees Ins. Co. v. Barclay, 206 A.2d 119, 121-124 (Md. 1965).
155 Taylor v. Bunge Corp., 845 F.2d 1323, 1329 (5th Cir. 1998).
156 44 A.Ai. JuR. 2D Insurance § 1770 (2005).
157 AGIP Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Gulf Island Fabrication, Inc., 920 F. Supp.
1318, 1326 (S.D. Tex 1996).
158 Taylor, 845 F.2d at 1329 (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murray
Plumbing & Heating Corp., 135 Cal. Rptr. 120, 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)).
159 Tri-State Ins. Co. of Mian. V. Commercial Group West LLC, 698 N.W. 2d
483, 487 (N.D. 2005).
160 206 A.2d 119 (Md. 1965).
2005] 425
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
owner's insurer paid for those repairs and then sued the pilot,
as subrogee, to recover all costs except for the deductible. 6 '
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 162 On appeal, the court held that when the pilot
rented the airplane from the airport facility, he was not an addi-
tional insured as to the hull loss coverage and, as such, the facil-
ity's insurer did have a right of subrogation against him.'63 In
reaching its conclusion, the court acknowledged the two differ-
ent types of coverage under the policy-liability coverage and
hull loss coverage. 164 The court examined the definition of in-
sured under the policy and noted that a permissive user was an
insured for the purposes of liability coverage only.'65 The court
held that the definition of insured did not extend to the hull
coverage. 66 In reaching its conclusion, the court relied heavily
on the fact that, under the hull loss coverage, there was a condi-
tion that provided the "policy would not inure, directly of indi-
rectly, to the benefit of any bailee."' 67
In Pacific Indemnity Co. v. United States, the Ninth Circuit found
that insurance coverage for hull damage did not inure to a "per-
missive user.' 168 Here, the insured was obliged to protect a per-
missive user against liability to third parties and their property,
but the hull coverage provisions did not use the same unquali-
fied terms as other provisions. 169 The court further held that a
cooperation clause did not create any ambiguity in the exten-
sion of coverage under the hull coverage.17 °
In Rushing v. International Aviation Underwriters, Inc., the lessee
of an aircraft appealed from an adverse judgment brought by
subrogee insurance company for damages to a covered air-
craft. '7 The lessee had leased the plane from the named in-
sured and, upon landing, improperly caused severe damage to
161 Id.
162 Id. at 121.
163 Id. at 121-22.
164 Id. at 122.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 124.
-6 463 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1972).
169 Id. at 1214.
170 Id.; see a/soGraham v. Rockman, 504 P.2d 1351, 1356-57 (Ala. 1972) (hold-
ing that where "insured" not defined in policy, named insured's reasonable ex-
pectation considered in determining whether subrogation allowable).
171 604 S.W.2d 239, 240-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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the plane. 72 The insurer paid for the damage under the hull
loss coverage of the lessor's policy and brought a subrogation
claim against the lessee."," The appellee argued that the in-
surer's claim was barred due to the named insured's forfeiture
of its corporate charter post filing of the subrogation action. 174
Additionally, the appellee argued that the lease agreement lim-
ited his liability to the deductible under the insurance policy
and that the insurer could not recover attorney's fees. 1 7 5 The
appellate court rejected both arguments, upheld the judgment
in favor of the subrogee insurance company and sustained the
award of attorneys' fees to the insurer. 176
In Insurance Co. v. Crippen, the Dallas Court of Appeals held
that the hull loss coverage of an aviation policy did extend to
cover a lessee of the airplane and that the lessee was therefore
entitled to be reimbursed under the hull loss coverage for mon-
ies it had paid to repair an airplane damaged while under the
lessee's control. 7 7 The court reasoned that the lessee became a
co-insured under the hull loss coverage of the policy by reason
of the lessor/named insured's "request that coverage be ex-
tended to include the lessee followed by the insurer's acquies-
cence and ratification."'17' Although this case is not a
subrogation action, it can be used to argue by negative infer-
ence that simply being an insured under an aviation policy for
liability does not automatically extend hull loss coverage to the
permissive user. If not for the "acquiescence" by the insurer, the
permissive user would arguably not have been considered cov-
ered under the hull loss provision.
In Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron, the
Tenth Circuit, applying Texas law, held that a "lien holder payee
under an endorsement extending breach of warranty coverage
was not an insured party for purposes of immunity from subro-
gation."'17 In Rocky Mountain Helicopters, the insured and its in-
surer filed suit against the manufacturer/lien holder payee of a
helicopter seeking damages arising out of a helicopter acci-
172 Id. at 240.




177 223 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.--Dallas 1949).
178 Id.
17) 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986).
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dent. 8 ' The lien holder payee asserted that it was immune from
a subrogation claim because it was an insured under its loss
payee endorsement.8 ' The court held that the lien holder
payee was, in fact, not an insured under the breach of warranty
endorsement. 18 2 More importantly, the court found that even if
the lien holder was an insured party, it would still be subject to
suit for liability and negligence and, in that event, the lien




Prior to renting, leasing or chartering aircraft, owners, as well
as pilots, would be well advised to understand how the policies
of insurance covering their subject aircraft will treat such uses in
the event of an accident. Failure to abide by the stated uses in
an aviation insurance policy could result in non-coverage and
have serious financial consequences for the uninformed aircraft
owner.
18o Id. at 909.
18, Id. at 910.
182 Id. at 914.
183 Id_
